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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has jurisdiction 
ever this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) 
(Supp. 1993). 
1 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the lower commit reversible error in admitting the 
holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun shells seized during the Paul 
residence? 
In State v. Ramriez, 817 P. 2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991) the 
court stated that, 
"on occasion, the legal standard for 
admissibility of evidence vests a measure of 
discretion in the trial court. For example, 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 requires that a 
trial court balance the probiveness of a piece 
of evidence against its potential for unfair 
prejudice; if the potential for unfair 
prejudice outweighs the probativeness, the 
evidence is excluded as a matter of law. Utah 
R. 403. The trial court initially performs 
that balancing. If it concludes that the 
evidence is admissible, we review the decision 
for correctness. But in deciding whether the 
trial court errored as a matter of law, we de-
facto grant it some discretion, because we 
reverse only if we conclude that it acted 
unreasonably in striking the balance. 
However, in State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1994) the court 
recognized "the term 'abuse of discretion' has no tight meaning." 
See also Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P. 2d 23, 26-27 
(Utah App. 1991) (recognizing the trial judge abuses his or her 
discretion where the conclusion of law is incorrect and where a 
finding of fact is clearly erroneous). In applying the law to the 
facts, however, "some" discretion is given to the trial judge. 
Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 781 n.3. 
II. Whether the trial counsel's questioning of witness Steven 
Kelly regarding unproved parole violation allegations was 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
2 
Reviewing courts are free to make an independent determination 
of the lower court's conclusions. Findings of fact must be clearly-
erroneous to be set aside. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. 
Templon, 805 P. 2d 182, 185-6 (Utah 1990). 
3 
STATMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgement and conviction for 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 
1993), On November 31, 1993 a jury convicted Soloman Lee Ford 
(Ford) of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
a second degree felony. On December 20, 1993, the court denied 
Ford's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to an indeterminant 
term of 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. Ford appealed his 
conviction to the Utah Court of Appeal by filing a notice of appeal 
in the Third District Court on January 19, 1994. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of August 19, 1994 Christine Gregg (Greg) and 
Bruce Gunnell (Gunnell) traveled to the apartment of Gregg at 619 
West: Ivy Street #4, Trial Record Day 1 at 147 (hereinafter T.R. 1 
at 147). Gregg lived in the second floor apartment of a four-plex 
on Ivy street T.R, 1 at 149. She had been away from her home for 
four to five days staying at the residence of Gunnell who was a 
friend. T.R. 1 at 146-147. Shortly after her return, the 
Defendant, Soloman Lee Ford (Ford), went to her apartment to speak 
to her. T.R. 2 at 45-46. Initially, Sharon Hawkins (Hawkins), a 
neighbor of Ms. Gregg and a friend of Ford's, came into Gregg's 
apartment with Ford to speak to Gregg. T.R. 2 at 46-7. However, 
she left the apartment to give Ford some time alone with his 
girlfriend, Gregg. T.R. 2 at 47. Ford apparently was upset 
because he did not want her to associate with Gunnell who had 
apparently supplied her drugs in the past. T.R. 2 at 48-9, 52. 
She also had left her child for several days with a babysitter 
without notice when meeting with Gunnell. T.R. 2 at 55. 
The evidence diverges at this point as to what happened. 
Hawkins testified that she heard no dispute coming from the open 
door of the Gregg apartment as she stood on a landing a few feet 
away smoking, but that Gunnell passed by her in a nervous manner. 
T.R. 2 at 56. She also indicated that she never saw Ford in 
possession of a firearm on this evening. T.R. 2 at 47. 
Gunnell, by contrast, testified that Ford walked into Gregg's 
apartment cleaning the barrel of a shotgun. T.R. 1 at 153, 157. 
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Ford walked in and out of the bedroom while cleaning the barrel. 
T\R, 1 at 151-3, 157. Eventually Ford came out of the bedroom and 
told Gunnell to leave. T.R. 1 at 154. Ford allegedly pulled a 
chrome .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol on Gunnell at about this 
time. T.R. 1 at 154. Gregg cried out for Gunnell to go and the 
child that was in her arms screamed. T.R. 1 at 155. Gunnell 
immediately drove to a local grocery store and called the police. 
T.R. at 155. 
Gregg initially refused to testify when called as witness at 
trial. T.R. 2 at 5. She claimed Ford entered her apartment with 
an item shaped like a barrel of a shotgun wrapped in a brown cloth 
but was unsure what it was. T.R. 2 at 9. Additionally, she 
tesrified that Ford had something silver in his hand when he asked 
Gunnell to leave but she also could have been imagining this. T.R. 
2 at 11. 
Officers Gruber (Gruber) and Vakapuna (Vakapuna) of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department responded to Gunnell's call placed from 
a local grocery store. T.R. 1 at 178-9. Gunnell related his 
account of the confrontation with Ford to the officers. T.R. 1 at 
179* The officers proceeded to Gregg's apartment to check on her 
welfare. Once they determined that she was unharmed, they 
approached two men that they had seen earlier one of which matched 
the description of Ford. T.R. 1 at 184-5. Both men were arrested 
and the officers began searching for the chrome pistol or shotgun 
around the neighbor and on Ford's probable path of travel. T.R. 1 
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at 186-8, No firearms were found during this search. T.R. 1 at 
188. 
Gruber later knocked on the door of the Pahl residence, an 
apartment immediately opposite to Gregg's place. T.R. 1 at 188. 
They were given permission by 15 year old Cody Pahl to search the 
Pahl residence. T.R. 1 at 188-9. During the course of the search, 
the police found a black nylon holster on top of a china cabinet in 
the living room. T.R. 1 at 209. They also found a red gym bay 
containing yellow shotgun shells, the stock of a gun, a bandalero, 
and a ski mask in Ms. Pahl's bedroom. T.R. 1 at 189. Gruber 
testified that the "sawed-off" shotgun was inoperable and that due 
to the lack of the barrel he could not tell the length of the gun. 
T.R. 1 at 192. The officers neither found a barrel or one that 
matched to the shotgun stock. T.R. 1 at 202. 
Cody Pahl testified that Ford had visited the Pahl residence 
previously but did not live there. He further stated that he had 
not seen Ford with the red gym bag that evening. T.R. 1 at 218-9, 
221. Likewise, Cody had never seen Ford in possession of a 
firearm. T.R. 1 at 223. 
Ford filed a pre-trial motion to suppress under rules 402 and 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence the items seized during the 
search of the Pahl residence. T.R. 1 at 191-95. The trial court 
granted the motion as to the ski mask but denied it as to the 
remaining items. T.R. 1 at 111-15. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The black holster, shotgun stock and shotgun shells were 
Inadmissible under 104(b) and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
No reasonable inference could be drawn from these items that Ford 
possessed a firearm. The of this evidence prejudiced Ford by 
confusing the ultimate issue and misleading the jury. The evidence 
vas also inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
because its probative value was so weak in comparison to its 
prejudicial impact. The Court abused it's discretion by admitting 
these of evidence resulting in harmful error which requires 
reversal of Ford's conviction. 
Additionally, trial counsel's failure to refrain from opening 
tie door to the admission of pending parole violations in the 
Feoeral Court allowed the admission of testimony setting forth the 
criminal history as well as pending allegations against Ford. 
Admission of these irrelevant matters prejudiced Ford by bringing 
otherwise inadmissible evidence. Trial counsel's actions 
constituted ineffective assistance. 
I. THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AGAINST FORD OBTAINED DURING THE 
SEARCH OF THE PAHL RESIDENCE IS IRRELEVANT. 
Relevancy is defined by rule 401, U. R. E. as "evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." According to 
Scate v. Royball, 710 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1985), relevant evidence 
assists the trier of fact in understanding the nature of the crime 
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or the manner in which the crime was committed. Evidence which can 
be provided through other means such as through testimony renders 
the admissions of the potentially prejudicial items minimally 
relevant. State v. Cloud, 722 P. 2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986). 
The evidence which was presented in this case prejudiced the 
Appellant. One witness testified at trial claiming to have seen a 
weapon. T.R. 1 at 154. To the contrary, Hawkins saw no such 
weapon. T.R. 2 at 47. The additional admission of the shotgun 
parrs which were inoperable as a firearm, shotgun shells and the 
holster which was not shown to have belonged to anyone, could only 
have distracted the jury from the actual issues of the case, 
wnether Ford was a restricted person who possessed a "firearm". 
II. THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF ITEMS OBTAINED DURING THE 
SEARCH OF THE PAHL RESIDENCE. 
Prior to trial, Ford moved for suppression of the holster, 
shotgun stock, and shotgun shells based on their highly prejudicial 
nature. The motion was denied by the trial judge. T.R. 1 at 112. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
"although relevant, evidence may excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." 
The admission of any disputed evidence is subject to Rule 
4J3's balancing test which weighs the probative value against the 
prejudicial effect. See, State v. Johnson, 784 P. 2d 1135, 1141 
(Utah 1985). 
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Utah Supreme Court has categorized certain types of evidence 
as having "an unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice a 
defendant, " most recently in State v. White, slip opinion case no. 
930S96-CA (1994). Weapons were not among the category listed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in that case. Nevertheless, the admission 
of the physical evidence i.e. an incomplete "weapon" or accessories 
"does distort the deliberative process and improperly skew the 
outcome" of the trial. Id. The jury may have believed parts of 
firearms or firearm accessories were equivalent to actual 
possession of a hand gun which was never and may not have existed. 
Stare v. Lafferty, 749 P. 2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). 
Utah courts have reversed cases under 403 when the disputed 
evidence does fit into the Lafferty categories. Such is the case 
in Mauer when the entire contents of a letter written to the 
victim's father by the defendant was admitted. The court, on 
appeal, ruled that parts of the letter were of such a nature that 
the letter induced a decision on a purely emotional basis. Ld at 
984. Other jurisdictions have enlarged the list of inherently 
prejudicial evidence to include weapons. In State v. Steele, 586 
P. 2d 1274, 1276 (Ariz. 1978) the court ruled that the "[t]he 
addition of gruesome objects such as photographs, clothing and 
weapons, when introduced for no other purpose than to inflame and 
arouse the passions of the jury can lead to a conviction resulting 
from the jury's revulsion and not from the State's proving the 
elements of the crime." (emphasis added). The State must have 
sought to admit the evidence of the holster, shotgun stock, and 
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shells because it was unable to find the weapon described by 
Gunnell. The admission of physical evidence was purely to 
"prejudice the minds of the jury" thereby causing the jury to 
believe mere presence of these parts and accessories equates to the 
actual possession of a different handgun. 
Shotgun: The admission of the incomplete parts of the shotgun 
mislead the jury in two ways. First, the jury must have believed 
that the shotgun stock is an operable weapon given the testimony of 
Kelly and Gruber. T.R. 1 at 143-5, 192. At trial, the State in 
opening lead the jury to believe that the parts of the shotgun 
admitted as evidence could be assembled, when in fact, detective 
Gruber stated later that the "shotgun" could not operate without 
more parts. T.R. 1 at 123, 198-9, 202. The barrel of the shotgun 
was not present. Therefore, the shotgun was inoperable. 
Second, the State mislead the jury by alleging that because 
the shotgun could be assembled and rendered operable the shotgun 
was therefore classified as a "weapon" under Utah Statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (2)(d)(Supp. 1993) states 
"'firearm' means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, 
rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a 
dangerous weapon from which is expelled a projectile by any force." 
The shotgun stock cannot be considered "a dangerous weapon 
from which is expelled a projectile by any force". Thus, the 
State's contention was false. The admission of the partial shotgun 
is consequently highly prejudicial. The shotgun stock is not a 
"weapon" as defined by statute as it was not operable in the form 
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presented at trial. The "shotgun" evidence lacked adequate 
probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect. Given the 
State's inability to produce the weapon described by Gunnell at 
trial, the admission of this prejudicial and questionably relevant 
evidence, created reversible error. 
SHOTGUN SHELLS: 
The admission of shells is prejudicial as stated in the 
previous argument because the shotgun is inoperable without all the 
pares and could not be classified as a weapon. 
During trial testimony from Gunnell, the shotgun shells 
defendant had in his hand were red. T.R. 1 at 174. Gruber 
testified that the shells in the bag yellow. T.R. 1 at 190. Gregg 
later testified that the Defendant may have had something yellow in 
his hand but that what she saw could have been imagined. T.R. 2 at 
10. 
The inconsistent testimony regarding the color of the shells 
and possible existence implies that the evidence lacks probative 
value and was therefore outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
Further, possession of shotgun shells would not assist the jury in 
determining whether Ford possessed a small caliber handgun. 
HOLSTER: 
During the search of the Paul residence a black nylon holster 
was found. Gruber testified that the holster was located on top of 
tne china cabinet. T.R. 1 at 212. 
Gunnell testified that Ford came into Ms. Gregg's apartment 
v/hile cleaning the barrel of the shotgun and he continued by saying 
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that Ford then left and returned with the small caliber semi-
automatic handgun. T.R. 1 at 150-4. 
Cody Paul testified that the Defendant was tending him while 
his mother was away that evening. Cody did not see Ford carry a 
red gym bag into the apartment. T.R. 1 at 220-222. Furthermore, 
he had never seen Ford with any type of gun or firearm. T.R. 1 at 
223. 
In an attempt to link the ostensible handgun to the Defendant, 
the State illicited testimony from Detective Gruber that the 
holster was one which holds a small handgun such as the handgun 
which Gunnell said Ford possessed. Again, no such handgun was ever 
found. It must be noted that Hawkins, the neighbor, stated that 
Mr. Ford did not have any such gun. T.R. 2 at 47. The purpose of 
the admission of the holster as evidence was to link Ford to the 
small caliber handgun. However, no witness ever saw him in 
possession of this holster, or any other for that matter. Thus, 
the holster lacked any probative value to outweigh its prejudicial 
effective. The mere presence of a holster in an apartment linked 
to no one, adds nothing to the State's contention that this 
Appellant possessed a handgun. 
III. ADMISSION OF THE HOLSTER, SHOTGUN STOCK AND SHOTGUN 
SHELLS WERE MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE AND THEREFORE 
CONSTITUTED HARMFUL ERROR. 
The cumulative effect of the admission by the Court of these 
items was an abuse of discretion. The evidence created 
substantially more prejudice to the Defendant than probative value 
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i.o the prosecution. The admission of evidence is harmful when "a 
reasonable likelihood exists that absent the error, the result 
would have been more favorable to the Defendant." State v. 
Dibeilo, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989). The "reasonable 
likelihood" standard is satisfied when the Appellate Court believes 
that: the "outcome [of the trial] is undermined." See State v. 
Verde, 770 P. 2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
"To state matters more precisely, [the court] 
reviews the trial court's 403 ruling admitting 
or denying admission to evidence by deciding 
whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's 
decision that "the unfair prejudicial 
potential of the evidence outweighs [or does 
not outweigh] is beyond the reasonability. 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1994) quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 781-
82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
Absent the holster, shotgun stock and shells the prosecution 
is left with no physical evidence and the jumbled, inconsistent 
testimony of witnesses on which to base their case. Consequently, 
the confidence of the outcome of the verdict must be undermined. 
A reasonable likelihood exists that without the holster, shotgun 
stock, and shotgun shells, the jury would not have convicted Ford. 
See State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) ("for an error 
to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict"). 
IV. TRIAL COUNSEL'S CROSS EXAMINATION OF MR. KELLY AMOUNTED 
TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE COUNSEL 
When federal probation officer Steve Kelly was under cross 
examination, defense counsel asked, "Mr. Kelly, you didn't have any 
other reported violations from Mr. Ford?" T. 141. On redirect 
14 
examination, the prosecutor asked Kelly, "have you filed something 
1
 an order to show cause or prepared a document in anticipation to 
show cause?'" T.R. 1 at 142. Defense counsel objected to the 
admission of this evidence, to which the Court responded, "You 
opened it up, Mr. Scrowcroft". T.R. 1 at 142. 
Kelly then proceeded to read from a document which listed the 
alleged parole violations that Ford committed: 
(1) The commission of the crime of aggravated 
assault; 
(2) The possession of a silver handgun; 
(3) The possession of a shotgun firearm; 
(4) The assault and injury to the eye of Gregg; 
(5) The failure to report his change of residence. 
T.R. 1 at 143-5. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
constitutional right to a fair trial includes the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. United States Constitutional 
Amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Strickland sets forth a two prong test for ineffective assistance 
claims. A Defendant's criminal conviction must be reversed "(1) 
when counsel's performance is deficient, and (2) when counsel's 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. 693. 
In the present case, trial counsel opened the door to the most 
damaging testimony at trial. The jury was made aware that a 
federal agency had also decided to take action on the allegations 
that were pending against Mr. Ford, and they were exposed to 
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allegations of misbehavior which would not otherwise been 
inadmissible i.e. the assault on a female and changing residence 
without notifying his probation officer. The admission of this 
evidence would normally be barred by Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence because it tends to cause a jury to think that the 
Defendant was a bad person and consequently acted in conformity 
with bad character in regards to the charged offense. State v. 
Saunders, 699 P. 2d 738 (Utah 1985). (Evidence of prior crimes is 
presumed prejudicial and absent a reason for the admission of the 
evidence other than to show Defendant acted in conformity is 
inadmissible). 
Additionally, trial counsel moved for and received severance 
of -che charges enumerated in the information. By his question to 
Kelly, counsel then made the severance immaterial. Adequate 
preparation would clearly have disclosed the danger of such 
inquiry. In this fashion, defense counsel failed to provide 
"reasonably competent" assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 693. 
Furthermore, absent trial counsel's unwise question the alleged 
parole violations would not have been available to the jury. These 
acts prejudiced the Defendant therefore creating a reasonable 
likelihood that trial counsel's deficient performance effected the 
outcome of the case. This is particularly true when no weapon was 
presented at trial and the credibility of Gunnell was of paramount 
importance. 
V. THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS IN ADMITTING THE SHOTGUN STOCK, 
SHELLS AND HOLSTER AS WELL AS THE UNWISE QUESTIONING OF KELLY 
16 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S PENDING PAROLE ALLEGATIONS PREJUDICED FORD TO 
THE EXTENT THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR 
TRIAL. 
The cumulative errors in admitting the shotgun stock, shotgun 
shells and holster as well as the unwise questioning of Kelly 
regarding Defendant's pending parole allegations prejudiced Ford to 
tne extent that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair 
trial. 
If the individual errors of admitting the evidence and of 
trial counsel's improper questioning Kelly are not adequate for 
reversal, the cumulative effect of these errors establishes 
prejudice sufficient to deny Mr. Ford's state and federal 
constitutional rights to a fair trial. Amendments VI, VIII, XIV, 
Constitution of the United States; Article 1, Sec. 7, 9, and 12, 
constitution of Utah State v. Ellis, 748 P. 2d 188, 191 (Utah 
1987); State v. Rimmell, 721 P. 2d 498, 501-2 (Utah 1986). 
CONCLUSION 
Absent the admission of testimony and physical evidence 
regarding items seized in the Pahl home and the unwise cross 
examination of Kelly by trial counsel, Ford's conviction could not 
SLand. Therefore, this court should reverse the conviction and 
lemand the case for a new trial. 
17 
Respectfully submitted, this ^--^pf^fday of August 1 994 





76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions. 
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally 
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws 
throughout the state. 
(b) The provisions of this part are uniformly applicable throughout this 
state and in all its political subdivisions and municipalities. No local 
authority may enact or enforce any rule in conflict with the provisions of 
this part. 
(2) For the purpose of this part: 
(a) ''Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use 
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In 
construing whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a 
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the character of the instru-
ment, object, or thing; the character of the wound produced, if any; and 
the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used are deter-
minative. 
ADDENDUM B 
76-10-503. Possession of dangerous weapon — Persons 
not permitted to have — Provisions for aliens — 
Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who is not either a citizen of the United States or a 
lawfully admitted alien whose business, occupation, or duties require the 
use of a dangerous weapon; or a lawfully admitted alien who has obtained 
a special hunting permit from the Department of Public Safety; or any 
person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under the lews of 
the United States, the state, or any other state, government, or country, 
or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or any person who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
this part. The Department of Public Safety shall adopt rules governing 
the issuance and use of special hunting permits for lawfully admitted 
aliens. 
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun, 
he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole for a felony or is incarcerated at the 
Utah state prison or other like facility may not have in his possession or 
under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this 
part. 
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third degree 
felony, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive or infernal 
machine, he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
ADDENDUM C 
1 parties and counsel are present. The jury is not present 
2 in the courtroom at this time. Mr. Scowcroft. 
3 MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Your Honor. I have 
4 filed three Motions in Limine and I would like the Court 
5 to rule on them at this time. 
6 The first motion I would like to address is the 
7 Motion in Limine to Suppress Evidence. I have attached 
8 some case law to that and a statute. And the motion, 
9 Your Honor, is to exclude under authority of Rules 402 
10 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the evidence 
11 seized from De Sol Pahl's apartment. The facts 
12 surrounding that seizure were presented to this Court 
13 during our Motion to Suppress this evidence on Fourth 
14 Amendment grounds which this Court denied. Suppression 
15 under Rule 402 and 403 is a separate basis to exclude 
16 this evidence. 
17 The evidence, as stated in my motion, includes 
18 red gym bag, parts of the shotgun, the shotgun shells, a 
19 ski mask and a holster. This evidence is probably not 
20 relevant to the charge; to the events that occurred on 
21 August 19th of 1993. It is alleged by the State that Mr. 
22 Ford possessed a small chrome handgun. 
23 First of all, in terms of the shotgun, there 
24 has not been any testimony that the shotgun was 
25 brandished or displayed by Mr. Ford on August 19th. 
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1 There was some testimony, I think the State wants to 
2 introduce testimony, that maybe a week earlier, Mrs. 
3 Gregg and perhaps Mr. Gunnell saw Mr. Ford in possession 
4 of parts of it or something like that of a shotgun. 
5 No. 2, the parts of the shotgun that were 
6 admitted as evidence in the Motion to Suppress earlier, 
7 do not constitute a firearm because they cannot function 
8 as a gun. They cannot shoot a projectile. And that is, 
9 firearm is def ined under 76—10—501 subsection D, which I 
10 have included with the motion. For that reason, these 
11 items, No. 1, are not relevant to the charge in the 
12 Information. Again, which is that Mr. Ford possessed a 
13 firearm on August 19th, firearm being a small revolver, 
14 that has never been recovered. 
15 Now my argument is basically the same for all 
16 of these items. Let me explain. I believe that the 
17 items further are the probative value of these items are 
18 substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
19 prejudice, confusion of the issues and misleading the 
20 jury. That is Rule 403 and that goes to evidence that 
21 may even be relevant to these charges, to the charge 
22 before the Court today. I know that the State will argue 
23 that the holster is relevant evidence because it is 
24 alleged that Mr. Ford possessed a handgun that was not 
25 found. 
92 
In terms of that piece of evidence, the holster 
was never seen in Mr. Ford's possession because the 
handgun was never found. It is mere speculation that the 
holster has anything to do with an alleged handgun, and 
for that reason I think it is unduly prejudice under 
these conditions. 
The other items of evidence, I think are 
clearly irrelevant and further are highly prejudicial and 
misleading for the reasons I have stated: that they don't 
go to the charge here, they are prior. Well, I will get 
to that in my next motion. 
I have attached a couple of cases here, Your 
Honor: State vs. De Alio and State vs. Maurer. De Alio, 
as you know, involves a trial for a drug charge, evidence 
taken from the defendant's apartment, was admitted at 
trial that went to prior bad acts. That is, it was a 
ledger book apparently, a search warrant going to some 
other unrelated bad act. So I think the facts of that 
case are in that way similar to the facts of this case in 
that the State would admit evidence going to a prior bad 
act, an act that the State alleges occurred about a week 
earlier. So I think admission of this evidence would be 
reversible error under these circumstances. 
I included Maurer simply because it contains a 
discussion of Rule 403. And I think what the Court needs 
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1 to look at is basically what the Court has is a balancing 
2 of probative value and prejudice, and I think as I have 
3 stated, the evidence here is not relevant to the charge. 
4 If it is relevant, it is highly prejudicial and should be 
5 excluded for those reasons. 
6 I have also filed a Motion in Limine under Rule 
7 403 and 404 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence to suppress 
8 evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts. And, of 
9 course, what this goes to is again these alleged, 
10 uncharged conduct that occurred maybe a week earlier or 
11 so. It is misleading. It is prejudicial and it is not 
12 relevant. 
13 I have also filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence 
14 of prior criminal history of Mr. Ford under Rules 403 and 
15 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. I think that my 
16 concern here, Your Honor, is that, if I could approach, 
17 this is a copy of a Judgment and Probate Commitment Order 
18 that I believe the State will try to admit into evidence. 
19 I understand that an element of this offense is the fact 
20 that Mr. Ford is on parole or probation. The State has 
21 said that it will call Steve Kelly, a probation officer, 
22 to testify that Mr. Ford is on parole. That document 
23 there does not say he is on parole. All it says is that 
24 he has been convicted for armed bank robbery and I would 
25 ask the Court to exclude any reference to the conviction 
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1 for armed bank robbery. It is unnecessary to prove the 
2 charge. It is highly prejudicial and so that is the 
3 basis for that motion. 
4 So really what we have here, we want to 
5 suppress any alleged prior bad acts that did not occur on 
6 the date of the crime charged here. We do not think the 
7 fact that he has allegedly been convicted for bank 
8 robbery ought to be admitted because it is prejudicial 
9 and it is irrelevant. What is relevant is whether or not 
10 he is on probation or parole. 
11 THE COURT: Isn't it on probation or parole for 
12 a felony? It doesn't say that? 
13 MR. SC0WCR0FT: No, it doesn't say that. It 
14 may be a lesser included offense, however, to have been -
15 
16 THE COURT: As charged is a second, though? 
17 MR. SC0WCR0FT: Right. 
18 THE COURT: A felony is an essential element of 
19 the offense, it seems to me. You disagree with that, Mr. 
20 Scowcroft? 
21 MR. SCOWCROFT: Yeah, it does need to be for a 
22 felony, that is true. And also, under 76-10-503, sub 1, 
23 it says any person who has been convicted of any crime of 
24 violence under the laws of the United States. 
25 MR. MORGAN: That applies to the other 
95 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, L. Clark Donaldson, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
mailed, first class postage, prepaid, eight copies of the foregoing 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this^^7% 
day of August, 1994. 
MAILED this day of August, 1994, 
19 
